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LICENSES-REVOCATIoN-LIABILITY or THEATRE OWNER FOR UNWARRANTED
EJECTION OF PATRON.-The plaintiff, a girl, fourteen years of age was on Satur-
days a weekly patron of the defendant's theatre. Some of the other patrons had
reported to the management that certain young girls, including the plaintiff, had
theretofore been annoying audiences during performances. The management di-
rected those in immediate charge of the theatre to exclude therefrom the girls
whose misconduct had been reported. Thereafter, on a Saturday afternoon, the
plaintiff, in the company of her aunt presented herself with her ticket of admis-
sion to the theatre, but the ticket taker refused to honor the ticket and directed
the plaintiff to go to the ticket office and receive return of the price paid. Plaintiff
inquired at once of the ticket taker why she was being excluded and the said
agent angrily replied substantially in words as follows: "That she could not at-
tend the show and that he would not permit her to enter; that she had been
guilty of such indecent conduct as rendered her an unfit and improper character
to enter the show; that she had been guilty of indecent and low-down conduct
in the show." This language was overheard by other persons then present, and
the effect of it was to send the girl away crying and to produce such shame
and humiliation that she went to bed and had to receive home treatment of
sedatives to relieve the shock and mental suffering. From a judgment for the
plaintiff, the defendant appealed. Held, that the power or privilege of the man-
agement of a theatre to eject disorderly persons or to revoke the license to enter
must be exercised within the limits of good order, and without insult, abuse or
defamation. Judgment affirmed. Saenger Theatre Corporation v. Herndon, 178
So. 86 (Miss. 1938).
The principal case is in accord with the general rule in the United States which
is that a ticket of admission to a place of amusement is, in the absence of statute,
a mere license, revocable at the will of the proprietor, and that the only remedy
for one who is refused admission without circumstances of aggravation, is in an
action on contract for the price of the ticket, or the actual pecuniary loss sus-
tained, 30 A. L. R. 952 (note). The American courts have in so holding followed
the decision of the English court in Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838 (1845),
which was decided ninety four years ago.
It is interesting to follow the reasoning of the courts in these cases. In Wood
v. Leadbitter the court said: "A mere license is revocable, but that which is called
a license is often something more than a license, it often comprises or is connected
with a grant, and then the party who has given it cannot in general revoke it,
so as to defeat his grant, to which it was an incident.... A right to come and
remain for a certain time on the land of another can be granted only by deed;
and a parol license to do so, though money be paid for it, is revocable at any time
and without paying back the money. . . .But where there is a license by parol,
coupled with a parol grant, or pretended grant, of something which is incapable
of being granted otherwise than by deed, there the license is a mere license; it is
not an incident to a valid grant and it is therefore revocable." In short the court
held that the ticket holder did not have a license coupled with a grant because
it could not be granted otherwise than by deed, and that since this was true the
ticket-holder had a mere license which could be revoked at any time.
The reasoning of the court in Wood v. Leadbitter is also expressed in a
United States Supreme Court case, Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 U. S.
633, 57 L. Ed. 679, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 901, 33 Sup. Ct. 401 (1913), where Mr.
Justice Holmes said: "We see no reason for declining to follow the commonly ac-
cepted rule. The fact that the purchase of the ticket made a contract is not
enough. A contract binds the person of the maker, but does not create an interest
in the property that it may concern unless it also operates as a conveyance. The
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ticket was not a conveyance of an interest in the race track, not only because it
was not under seal, but because by common understanding it did not purport
to have that effect. There would be obvious inconveniences if it were construed
otherwise. But since it did not create such an interest, that is to say, a right in
rem, valid against the landowner and third persons, the holder had no right to
enforce specific performance by self-help. His only right was to sue upon the
contract for the breach. It is true that if the contract were incidental to a right
of property either in the land or in the goods upon the land, there might be an
irrevocable right of entry, but when the contract stands by itself, it must be either
a conveyance or a license, subject to be revoked."
Another theory is brought out in the case of Homey v. Nixon, 213 Pa. 20,
61 A. 1088 (1905), in which the court said: "The proprietor of a theatre is a
private individual, engaged in a strictly private business, which, though for thi
entertainment of the public, is always limited to those whom he may agree to
admit to it. There is no duty, as in the case of the common carrier, to admit
everyone who may apply and be willing to pay for a ticket, for the theatre pro-
prietor has acquired no peculiar rights and privileges from the state, and is there-
fore under no implied obligation to serve the public. When he sells a ticket he
creates contractual relations with the holder of it, and whatever duties on his
part grow out of these relations be is bound to perform, or respond in damages
for the breach of his contract."
The minority rule is that a ticket of admission to a place of amusement is
more than a mere license, revocable at the will of the proprietor, and that the
ticket holder has the right to enter and stay and witness the whole performance,
provided he behaves properly and complies with the rules of the management.
30 A. L. R. 955, (1924) (note).
Wood v. Leadbitter is no longer law in England as it was supplanted by the
case of Hurst v. Pictures Limited, 1 K. B. 1, 8 B. R. C. 856, (1915) which held
that a ticket of admission to a theatre or show is not a license revocable at will
but entitles the holder to remain throughout the entire performance unless his
conduct affords reasonable ground for his ejection. The doctrine of Wood v.
Leadbitter prevailed until the passage of the Judicature Act. Under this statute,
by virtue of which the courts give effect to equitable considerations and will
protect rights in equity which but for the absence of an instrument under seal
would be rights at law, the old rule has been departed from. In Hurst v. Pictures
Limited, the court said, "It cannot be said as against the plaintiff that -he is a
licensee with no grant merely because there is not an instrument under seal which
gives him a right at law. There is another way in which the matter may be put.
If there be a license with an agreement not to revoke the license, that if given
for value, is an enforceable right. If the facts here are, as I think they are?that
the license was a license to enter the building and see the spectacle from its com-
mencement until its termination, then there was included in that contract a con-
tract 'not to revoke the license until the play had run to its termination. It was
then a breach of contract to revoke the obligation not to revoke the license."
The High Court of Australia in Cowell v. Rosehill Racecourse Co., 1937 Argus
Law Rep. 273, refused to follow the decision of the Court of Appeals in Hurst
v. Picture Theatres. The High Court held that a person who pays to enter a place
of public entertainment acquires a mere license not coupled with any interest and
therefore revocable at will, so as to constitute him a trespasser if he refuses to
leave after revocation. Since Cowell v. Rosehill Racecourse Co., supra, is a mere
recent decision it may be taken to indicate a trend away from the Hurst case, but
it cannot be said to have supplanted it as the law in England. For my purpose
I shall continue to treat Hurst v. Picture Theatres as the law applicable in Eng-
land.
In Drew v. Peer, 93 Pa. 234 (1880), the court said: "We incline to the opinion,
however, that as purchaser and holders of tickets for particular seats they bad
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more than a mere license. Their right was more in the nature of a lease entitling
them to peaceable ingress and egress, and exclusive possession of the designated
seats during the performance on that particular evening."
Under the minority rule then we have cases which hold that the ticket holder
has a license coupled with an implied agreement that it will not be revoked, and
those which hold that the ticket holder has a right in the nature of a lease.
I submit that the results reached by the courts which hold that the ticket
holder has more than a revocable license are more desirable. Courts following the
majority view have carried the doctrine of stare decisis to the extreme. The out-
standing example of a court that has done so is the New Jersey Court in Schubert
v. Nixon Amusement Co., 83 N. J. L. 101, 83 At. 369 (1912), where it said: "In
view of the substantially uniform approval of and reliance on the decision in Wood
v. Leadbitter in our state adjudications, it must fairly be considered to be adopted
as part of our jurisprudence, and whatever views may be entertained as to the
natural justice or injustice of ejecting a theatre patron without reason, after he
has paid for his ticket and taken his seat, we feel constrained to follow that de-
cision as the settled law, and leave the question of changing it to the legislature
to whom the decision of such questions belongs." American courts are in the posi-
tion of using as authority an English case which is no longer law in England. The
argument that the ticket holder has not a license coupled with a grant because
it could not be granted otherwise than by deed is based upon a technical rule of
property. Courts could, but have not dared, give effect to the intention of the
contracting parties in the face of this objection. The argument -that the theatre
proprietor has acquired no peculiar rights and privileges from the state, and is
therefore under no implied obligation to serve the public is made to refute those
who argue that there is an analogy here to the cases involving common carriers.
This argument does not preclude the implication of an agreement not to revoke
the license.
Under the holding of the majority of courts if A has paid for his seat in the
theatre, and has entered and taken his seat, and is, behaving himself satisfactorily,
the proprietor may, simply because he desires so to do, before A has seen the
performance which he has paid to see, eject him, or if a friend of the proprietor
says to the management: "Ask the person on my left to leave," it would be
competent for the management to do so. From these illustrations the question is
raised, for what does a man bargain when he buys a ticket of admission? It it
not the right to enjoy the entire performance from its beginning to its end? Is it
in accordance with good sense to allow the proprietor to say: "I hereby sell you
the right to see an entire performance" and then permit him in his very next
breath to say without reason: "I do not like the color of your hair, you must
leave now?" I think not. Implied warranties are not unknown in American juris-
prudence. Why not, subject to the theatre patron's good behavior, imply a war-
ranty not to revoke the license until the termination of the performance? They
have done this in England and there seems to be no objection to our so doing.
I wholeheartedly indorse the expressions of Judge J. Cothran found in his dis-
senting opinion to Bouknight v. Lester, 119 S. C. 466, 112 S. E. 274 (1921), in
which he says: "I concede that the great weight of authority, including the Su-
preme Court of the United States is in favor of the proposition that a ticket to a
theatre is a revocable license, and that the proprietor has the right without cause
to exclude the holder or eject him after he has been allowed to enter and take a
seat. A thorough investigation and study of possibly fifty cases sustaining this
doctrine has increased the shock experienced upon the suggestion of the proposi-
tion. I rise from it with the conviction that it does not appeal or conform to my
common sense, conscience, or conception of law, and, in the absence of controlling
authority in this state, I decline to subscribe to it."
Stewart J. Roche.
